então concluiremos que uma palavra, quando dita, dura mais que o som e os sons que a formaram, ca por a i, invisivel e inaudivel para poder guardar o seu pr oprio segredo... Jos e Saramago, A Jangada de Pedra 1988 we may conclude that a word, once said, persists longer than the vibration or the sound that formed it, it stays there, invisible and inaudible so as to preserve its very own secret...
Introspective attractors
Modeling brain function by neural networks can be roughly divided along the lines separating feed-forward networks and feed-back, or attractor networks. A very clear and informative manifestation of the presence of attractors in temporal cortex of primates is presented in the recent studies of Miyashita et al 1, 2, 3] (See also e.g.
ref. 4])
. Here I will suggest that most of the results observed in these seminal experiments could be predicted on the basis of simple observations on common cognitive phenomena, without recourse to any speci c model. One can then argue that considerations of such type have, most probably, underlaid Hebb's postulation of synaptic dynamics as a means for stabilizing reverberations in neural assemblies. The rst consequence of this discussion is the potential usefulness of such a mechanism of reverberations as an organic way for dissecting the complexity of the connection between sensory input and motor reaction.
Consider the familiar every-day situation in which one is given the task of translating a word from one language to another. The word is known in both languages, i.e. both words are in memory. Suppose further that the task is communicated verbally (spoken). Both the task and the word in the rst language are well understood. The acoustic stimulus disappears as soon as its communication is completed. It may be the case that the response, the word in the second language, is produced very rapidly and correctly. It may though be the case (equally familiar) that the rst word is recognized; there is a strong sense that also the translated word is known, but the retrieval of the corresponding word is not possible. One knows that one knows, yet one does not know. One can go on with the e ort of the retrieval of the translated word for quite a while, despite the absence of the provoking stimulus. Even the situation in which the the entire episode, word-task, withers away from our consciousness, only to surface resolved hours or days later, is quite common.
During this long search period, conscious or unconscious, the rst (the given) word must have been available. But it must have been available in a sense that goes beyond the fact that it was contained in our memory, i.e. we knew it. After all there are very many words we know in the rst language. What is special about this particular word, of course, is that it has been tagged by the stimulus { the sound of the spoken word.
This naive resolution of the problem posed by the familiar cognitive situation has quite signi cant implications. Somewhere in the skull, between the locus of the fully pre-processed stimulus and before the beginning of a generation of a response, there must be stations storing, passively, many memories. Those are the things we know and remember. They are, most likely, stored in the synaptic structure of each station. Each of these stations must be able to maintain one memory out of the passive stock (the one tagged by the stimulus) in a special status, for relatively long times. It must be able to maintain it in a status which will make it available for future attempts to perform the task.
In fact, this type of consideration leads also to the conclusion that the number 2 of such stations must be relatively high. One seems to be able to maintain several items concurrently in the tagged status. Those may be related to several items involved in a given task; items involved in di erent tasks which interweave during long time intervals of inattentive processing and also possibly the active presence of the tasks themselves to which we return brie y below. Consequently, the cortex must be modular. Both anatomy and physiology provide hints as to the geometry (in terms of cortical volume, localization and number of neurons). See also discussion of the experiments in Section 5.
The concept of attractors { active and passive memory
The attractor picture of a cortical module is, brie y, as follows: The module consists of a relatively large ensemble of neurons (of order 10 5 cells), in which the probability that any two neurons be connected by a synapse is high (a few percent su ce). Such an ensemble of cells is geometricly localized in about 1mm 2 of cortical surface. Experience (training) structures (in a Hebbian way) the set of connections, i.e. the set of synaptic e cacies. The resulting synaptic structure is such that when a stimulus activates a subset of the neurons in the module, i.e. raises their spike rates and then is turned o , the activity of the neurons in the ensemble may, depending on the stimulus, either: Decay rapidly back to spontaneous levels { stimulus ignored. Or, for other classes of stimuli, maintain for long times a stimulus-selective subset of the neurons at elevated rates in the absence of the stimulus. In other words, the synaptic structure provides su cient structured feedback so that the a erents (inputs) due to the distribution of activity among neurons with elevated spike rates, maintains the same set of neurons active, leaving the others at spontaneous levels. The collective nature of this dynamical state of a airs, i.e. the fact that the elevated activity of each neuron is maintained by many others, makes the attractors impressively immune to disorder in the synaptic structure as well as to dynamical noise. Both of which are unavoidable in cortical conditions. What determines which con gurations of neurons in the assembly can collectively maintain each other in the elevated activity state, is the synaptic matrix. This is passive memory. What determines which of the possible, self-maintaining con gurations actually reverberates in the module, is the stimulus. The short appearance of the stimulus`tags' one of the passive memories by activating the particular attractor associated with this stimulus. The activated con guration in the assembly is an attractor in the sense that each of these con gurations is activated by a wide class of stimuli, in some sense close to each other. The active con guration then is the representative of the class. This is what often goes under the name of content addressable memory or, less commendably, as associative memory, in contrast to physical address referencing of memory used in digital computers.
The attractor type of memory activation contrasts with the computer in yet another sense. In the computer, when a piece of information is to be acted on, it is taken from its address and put in a special section of the processor for action. This, in some sense, in analogous to the activation of a passive memory. In the neural module, however, not only is the addressing done by content and not by physical address, but the activation leaves the item in the module. In some sense the module is both the memory and the register. Thus while in the computer the activation of a memory item is signalled by the special location (the register), in the cortical module, we argue, the activated memory is distinguished by the activity. The place remains invariant. Moreover, the computer register can hold any information con guration for processing, the attractor module will hold only the representatives of classes that had been learned into the synaptic structure.
I am not emphasizing these distinctions to imply a preference. It simply that in a system like the cortex the register option is not available, because the register will also be made of neurons and to maintain an item for later processing can rely only on synapses and we are back in square one.
It is important to make a clear distinction at this point between the tagged persistent memories and concepts such as short, intermediate and long term memory. The latter refer usually to the stock of passive memories, i.e. to the duration of the synaptic programming or to the duration of its accessibility. They relate to the ability of the system (the brain) to manipulate incoming tasks. The tagged persistent item introduces an additional \temporal" category: the persistent activity distribution excited by a stimulus. A memory of this type (sometimes referred to as working memory, see e.g. 8, 9] ) can belong to any of the three temporal categories. This basic distinction is sometimes overlooked, and even by Hebb himself. See e.g. second quote from Hebb and discussion in Section 4.
The simplest conceivable carrier of such a tagging signal is the persistent distribution of elevated spike rates (Hebbian reverberations) among the neurons in the module (Hebb's cell assembly). One may contemplate other stimulus selective taggings of stored memories, but those would be much more di cult to observe. Since persistent spike distributions in the absence of the provoking stimulus are governed mainly by the synaptic structure in the local assembly, the tokens maintained there during the prolonged performance of the task will be prototypal. It is likely that the structure of such reverberations will not depend on details of the stimulus, such as the tone, the pitch or the modulation of the acoustic signal communicating the original word. In theoretical models the dynamics of multi neuron systems, when maintaining activity distributions in the absence of the stimulus, gives rise to a global dependence on the stimulus: Large classes of stimuli will provoke the same persistent spike distribution for all stimuli in a class. Stimuli which are di erent enough provoke di erent persistent activities. In this sense the activity distributions in the reverberations can be considered as representations of the class of stimuli that provoke it.
It may be useful to clarify the role that is ascribed in the present context to the word internal`representation', given that it is at the center of so much debate in the community of cognitive science. In the computational situation described above, in which the performance of the task on the stimulus (the word to be translated) is to take place long after the stimulus has disappeared, seems to leave little choice. When the task is to be nally carried out, it must have an operand. That token, which survives somewhere in the cortex, is a representation of the set of equivalent stimuli. Such a token seems to be logically required and a candidate for it is experimentally observed, as we recount below in Section 5.
The independence of the reverberation in the local assembly of the details of the stimulus does not imply that the internal representation does not depend on the task. Since the stimulus contains the word as well as the task, the persistent token may, in principle, depend on both. Yet the fact that the same word can be involved in many di erent tasks { rhyming, opposite, synonyms etc, suggests that the task may be represented also, or only, elsewhere. The linking of two separate representations is still an open problem to be investigated both experimentally and theoretically. 3 The cortical processing cut Admitting the presence of such reverberating stations in the cortex splits a potential feed-forward picture, describing cognitive (psychological) behavior. The split takes place inside the cortex and the boundary lines may lie at di erent distances from di erent sensory mechanisms. Roughly speaking, there is a three-way division:
The formation (learning) and the function of the organic system leading from the external world to the persistence stations: i.e. the preprocessing of the input required for the formation of di erent internal representations (the structure of the persistent taggings) for signi cantly di erent stimuli;
The formation and the activation of the internal representations (persistent taggings, Hebb's reverberations, see below) by the pre-processed a erent stimuli, and the interaction between activated reverberations in di erent stations (modules);
The organization and the functioning of the decoding of the cortical reverberations into computationally driven reactions.
This split of the cognitive computational machine is advantageous for experimental as well as for theoretical study. The above comments imply that the persistent tagging represents (at least for a while) some abstract feature of the stimulus involved in the task. Hence the neuro-physiologist can search for these local modules (Hebb's assemblies) in the cortex of the performing mammal, in the course of the performance of a prescribed behavioral paradigm. The tentative acceptance of spike rate distributions allows an easy read-out, by the neuro-physiologist, of the relevant representations. This he can do by single unit recordings to be analyzed o -line. He can count on the fact that the internal representations he will observe will not depend on particular details in the manifestation of the stimulus, provided the stimulus has been correctly classi ed (interpreted) by the subject animal. The latter can be monitored by the animal's response in the course of the experimental paradigm.
From the point of view of cognitive science one representation may be as good as any other. The opportunity provided by the Hebbian cut is that it allows a direct, empirical expression for the representations to replace a metaphorical one. As is argued in Section 5, below, the quantitative properties of the representations discussed here can be measured. A few tens of milliseconds following the disappearance of the stimulus, what is in these attractors is all there is to be for the completion of the mental computation. Given a direct and measurable commitment for the representations the speculations of cognitive science can proceed with reference to a well de ned body of data on the neuro-physiological level. The realistic neural underpinning is required to inform the speculation about the potential as well as the limitation of the infrastructure.
The above properties are not common to all modeling paradigms of internal representations. For example, in a feed-forward description of computation, a particular pattern of neural activation persists only for as long as the stimulus is on. A given neural activity distribution, provoked during the imposition of the stimulus, cannot be supposed to be available for computation at a later time. Moreover, the activity distribution may be sensitive to the particular details of the imposed stimulus. Thus the activity distribution may be richer than what is actually used for continuing the computational process. It may therefore not provide su cient constraints on the computation. The attractor, in contrast, contains measurable information for long times and that information is the same for all stimuli which are classi ed by the same attractor.
Moreover, the attractor dynamics distinguishes naturally between the course of an unfamiliar stimulus and a familiar one. The former being a stimulus signi cantly di erent from the ones that one has learned to classify. Attractor dynamics leaves all neurons in the module at very low activity levels, despite the fact that during the presentation of the stimulus as many neurons may be excited as for a familiar stimulus. This distinction is not naturally available for alternative paradigms of representation.
The collection of such representations and of their dependence on the task can provide invaluable information about how computation is organized in the cortex. But before proceeding with the elaboration of the experimental and theoretical account and perspectives, I return to the subject of this essay's title, to Donald Hebb.
4 Multi-component Hebbian paradigm
Allusions to Hebb abound in the preceding text. They have not been explicitly formalized because I have been trying to emphasize the intuitive appeal and the almost imperative nature of the local internal representations. Yet I believe that whatever is valid in this picture must have been clearly perceived by Donald Hebb many years ago. Someone joining the eld in the last decade nds innumerable references to Hebb's work. But the general tenor of these references is of a synaptic engineering type. Almost any type of synaptic learning in neural networks genu ects in Hebb's direction. Yet Hebb was not a neuro-chemist nor a neuro-physiologist. He was a psychologist searching for a neurally based infrastructure to psychology, to supplement, or replace, the mythological one.
The Hebbian paradigm is multi-dimensional. It is composed of a prescription for synaptic modi cations: synapses are modi ed by a erent stimuli in a way that tends to stabilize the pattern of activity provoking the synaptic modi cations. The stable neural activity distributions are excited in the local assembly by each of the learned stimuli. This is an unsupervised learning mode which aims at producing synaptic structures which can sustain a selected set of activity distributions in the local assembly, to use Hebb's language. The role of the resulting synaptic structure is to sustain the local activity produced by a stimulus in the absence of the provoking stimulus. To maintain the activity provoked by the stimulus in the presence of the stimulus does not require any synaptic modi cation.
Hebb's paradigm is not about the activity generated in one assembly by the activity present in another. It is not a feed-forward picture, for good or for bad. It can be summarized as a process generating the feed-back connectivity required for maintaining reverberations (persistent spike distributions) in a local network by the activity in the same network. The citations below make this point quite clearly.
Let us assume that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity (or \trace") tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability... When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in ring it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A's e ciency, as one of the cells ring B, is increased. 11]
Elsewhere Hebb says 12], It seems that short-term memory may be a reverberation in the closed loops of the cell assembly and between cell assemblies, whereas long term memory is more structural, a lasting change of synaptic connections. p. 110, emphases in the original] This is not intended as a hagiography of Donald Hebb, nor proof by dogma, nor a decomposition of texts. Rather, it is an attempt to salvage a profound idea from excessive fragmentation which has obscured the potential functional three-way split of the cognitive computational machine. In particular, it has caused an underestimation of phenomena necessary for mental processing, phenomena which can relatively easily be observed neuro-physiologically and which can provide precious information for deciphering some basic ideas pertinent to cortical computation.
Note that in the second quote the distinction between long term memory and active memory is implied, yet the terminology is not adopted. Clearly, the reverberation is an active state of the assembly, while the structure of the synaptic organization is not. Moreover, the reverberation must be sustained by the underlying synaptic structure, and hence it is a particular expression of the properties of the synaptic structure. A given synaptic structure may persist for short, intermediate or long terms.
To conclude this speculative part it may be of value to point out an additional bonus promised by this outlook. It is known anatomically, physiologically and neurologically that as one proceeds along the elaboration path in the cortex, one always nds back projections, as far back as into the primary sensory areas. On the other hand, it is a very familiar experience to have a given sensory power notably improved when the content of the observed stimulus is known. For example, when vision is impeded by distance or haze so that a given object cannot be discerned (or read), receiving a cue as to the nature of the object (or the written text) often produces a clear perception of the target. In other words, suppose that the sensory information about an object is not su cient to produce recognition. Suppose further that other information about the object is given (vocally, for example) some time prior to the observation of the object. The information in the vocal signal had been recognized well, and hence has excited a reverberation in some module. The back-projections from this module to the more primary areas in which the visual signal is being processed may provide su cient additional speci c information to make recognition possible. The special role of the reverberation is to make the contingent information available long after the signal producing it has disappeared. Hebb's idea about reverberation in cortical assemblies seems to have been motivated by observations of Lorente de N o 13] on neural diagrams of Golgi stained cortical slices made by Ramon y Cajal. The neural diagrams discussed by Lorente de N o contained a small number of neurons, because the staining method makes a small fraction of the neurons in the slice visible. Hence the feed-back circuits observed seemed relatively simple and suggested simple ows. Hebb was aware of the fact that the circuits were too simple and would probably not be able to sustain a reverberation for su ciently long time. And that to ensure long living reverberations a much larger number of neurons would be required. See e.g. 12].
Experimental evidence for Hebbian reverberations and beyond
The fact that local reverberations are almost a logical necessity does not remove the need to test their existence empirically. This has been done in the last few years in a particularly convincing way by Miyashita et al. 1, 2, 3] , in a culmination of a program started some twenty years ago by Fuster 14] and Niki 15] . In these experiments monkeys are trained to perform delayed image matching (delayed match to sample DMS) of visual images. The images are supposed meaningless for the monkey and mutually uncorrelated in their geometrical structure. For this purpose the images are generated by a computer using a graphic procedure with several stochastic components. Typical images are given in Fig. 1 . Following training, testing proceeds according to the following protocol: 1. an image appears on the screen for a short period (200ms); 2. The screen remains blank for a prolonged period (as long as 16 seconds); 3. a second image appears brie y; 4. the monkey should react selectively upon whether the rst and second image have been the same or di erent.
Training is performed, prior to the insertion of recording electrodes, by presenting the monkeys long sequences of pairs of images as described above, and rewarding them for correct responses. In di erent experiments the sequence of rst images is varied. For example, the rst images can be drawn at random from a store of generated images; or, it can be a xed sequence shown in a xed order; the set of images can be divided into pairs, the members of each pair follow each other in a xed order as rst stimulus during training, the pairs are selected at random. The second stimulus is always randomly selected with about 50% chance of being equal to the rst. Note that the existence and the structure of the attractor depends only on the rst stimulus. The second stimulus, the one used for matching serves to maintain the attention to the task. The ordering of rst stimuli applies exclusively to the training phase. During testing, rst stimuli are drawn at random.
By impressive use of circumstantial evidence Miyashita et al. succeed in identifying a small part (about 1mm 2 ) of anterior ventral temporal (AVT) cortex where stimulus selective persistent activity is manifested during the delay period, i.e. in the interval between the presentations of the rst and second images, in which the stimulus is absent. The fact that the selective activity distribution can persist for as long as 16 seconds, in a rather noisy environment, is convincing evidence for the local maintenance of a reverberation by the feed-back in the synaptic structure.
The main ndings of these experiments, as seen by a theorist, are 1. Self-sustained, long lived, stimulus selective spike rate distributions (reverberations) exist in the cortex; 2. The locus of the reverberations is locally modular, i.e. within a given cortical region they appear to concentrate in one restricted part. Namely, the module could be considered as a spatially cohesive group of neurons, in contrast to a sparsely distributed collection. This fact concords well with the anatomical observations , e.g. 16] , which indicate that the probability of synaptic connectivity between neurons in cortex falls o with separation. But within a range of 1mm that probability is still of the order of several percent. Thus, despite the fact that single synaptic contacts in cortex are typically weak (on the order of 100 pre-synaptic inputs are required to elicit a spike 5, 6]), this level of connectivity allows for the maintenance of robust attractors 1 ; 3. The reverberations are reproducible on the single unit level, i.e. the rates recorded on the same electrode from the same cell depend only on the stimulus leading to the reverberation. In other words, during testing the rst stimuli of the trials are presented in random order, hence between two presentations of the same image as rst stimulus many other images intervene as rst stimuli. Yet the delay activity is independent of this history. The reverberations can be considered as internal representations of the stimulus, in the sense discussed in Section 1, above; , that each of the correlated attractors contains information (expressed in neural activities) about the image activating it as well as about the images activating the attractors correlated with it. Hence, each attractor knows' about its neighbors in the temporal sequence; 9. In a di erent learning protocol, in which the sequence of rst stimuli is presented as a set of permanently ordered pairs, the internal representation becomes identical for both members of each pair. So does the behavior of the monkey in the behavioral paradigm. This does not imply that the monkey cannot detect the di erence between the two pictures, but only that in the module used for generating the response for this speci c task the two representations merge.
The above presentation of the empirical situation requires several notes of clarication. On the one hand, we have emphasized the distributive and collective nature of the internal local representations and on the other, the reproducibility of recordings of single units. This apparent contradiction disappears if one keeps in mind that the enhanced, persistent activity of any individual neuron can only be sustained due to the support of its fellow neurons participating in the same reverberation, via the synaptic local feed-back. The activity of the single neuron, therefore, carries information about the stimulus only if it is accidentally selective between the di erent distributed reverberations. Among the active neurons there may be several that have the same activity in di erent representations. On the other hand, the fact that the reverberations are dominated in their detail by the synaptic structure, and not by ne details of the stimulus, implies that every time the same stimulus is presented, the same reverberation is aroused. Consequently, the internal representations, for This precludes, of course, observing phenomena related to correlations in spike emission times if those manifest themselves in di erent neurons. To observe those, multi-unit probes are required. Yet, I feel that the information, representational, computational and cognitive, contained in rate distributions is far from exhausted. On the other hand, the relative facility of access to this type of information as well as of its analysis and modeling, compared to multi-electrode data, makes it a very attractive subject of investigation.
Empirical and cognitive implications
A signi cant aspect of the generation of random images in the Miyashita experiments is that it is quite likely that the correlations between internal representations of stimuli are due only to their context dependence, i.e. their frequent contiguous appearance in the training phase. The e ort invested in the generation of the images is recompensed by the fact that in some sense the registered correlations between the attractors are the minimal correlations among internal representations: those due purely to the constraints imposed on the learning process by the sequential training and the existence of attractors.
The attractor picture and the observed correlations it creates among internal representations have a rather universal feature. The dynamical tagging of a given memory may produce persistent activities in several modules in the cortex. The representation of one stimulus in di erent modules may represent di erent features of the stimulus, such as color, shape etc... Di erent modules may be involved in the generation of di erent types of reactions. One gets the impression, from the experiments of the Miyashita group, that the observed module in AVT is directly related to the pair association task 3], while it is not as directly related to the matching task. The universality intended here is that this does not matter, in the sense that wherever the attractor related to the reaction is, it must represent similar correlations of the internal representations, because those depend only on the fact that one is learning one attractor while reverberating in a previous one.
This observation suggests that one may use the lessons of these experiments to speculate directly about human cognitive psychology. The the fact that correlations form between the attractors representing semantically meaningless, uncorrelated stimuli implies that priming phenomena should be observed among stimuli of this kind. 2 The only condition is that they be presented in an ordered sequence during training, independently of whether we can observe the attractor cortical network involved in the cognitive task or not. That priming should take place in a situation of correlated attractors can be concluded intuitively, and is con rmed in model networks. It is the mere observation that if the assembly is in a given reverberation, due to the priming stimulus, the test stimulus to be recognized will nd it easier (and hence faster) to provoke a transition to another reverberation attractor, the more similar the activity distribution in the latter attractor is to the priming attractor.
Thus, purely on the phenomenological, pre-theoretical level, given the observation of correlated attractor representations, one is lead to consider for example:
1. Testing priming e ects in humans with semantically meaningless stimuli, essentially imitating the Miyashita experiments, but measuring reaction time changes upon priming. One would expect a decrease in the priming e ect with the distance in the training sequence, i.e. with decrease of the correlation between the internal representations. 2. Investigating the assumption that false alarms 17] are also caused by attractor correlations. 3 This hypothesis can be tested most clearly upon sequentially memorized semantic-free stimuli. 3. Testing the e ects of the intensity of temporal correlations on the internal attractor correlations. In other words, one can prepare a set of stimulus sequences with increasing proportion of sequences of xed order, the others being random. One should expect a threshold behavior in the priming e ect as a function of this proportion. 2 Priming is the experimental observation that the time for recognition of an incomplete pattern is shortened if the presentation of the stimulus to be recognized is preceded by the presentation of a cognitvely related stimulus. 3 False alarms is an experiment in which a subject is required to identify whether a given stimulus belongs to a subset of stimuli or not. The e ect is that when the test stimulus is correlated (cognitively) with one of the items in the subset, the number of wrong`yes' answers increases.
Similarly, the attractor interpretation of the experiments suggests informative extensions of the experiments in primate`cognitive-neuro-physiology':
An immediate consequence of the framework proposed is that simple attractors (internal representations) must be formed prior to the correlated ones, as an intermediate stage in forming correlated attractors. Hence, one should nd a point in the training process at which internal representations exist, but express no correlations; A related experiment to the one above is to train at length with patterns presented in a random sequence. Internal representations should form, but they should be uncorrelated. Their correlations with the activity distributions driven by the stimuli themselves, would be invaluble to the solidi cation of the modeling e ort; One can perform on monkeys the priming experiments, suggested for humans above, while observing attractor transitions in the cortical module under investigation; One can extend the experiments on pair association 3], which have been interpreted as attractor fusing. This can be done by measuring the correlations between pair representations in situations of partial ordering of the pairs in the training phase. Speci cally, in the experiment rst stimulus images belonging to a pair were always shown, during training, contiguous and in the same order, while pairs were selected at random. One can conceive of keeping the strict ordering within each pair and having each pair followed by a given pair with some probability p and choosing the subsequent pair at random with probability 1-p; It is of importance to establish the structure of the distribution of activity in the module following the response; But most important would be the identi cation of the additional representation modules in the cortex. These would be in di erent parts of the cortex, or even outside it, as di erent dimensions of a stimulus seem to be stored at di erent stations along the cortical elaboration path. See e.g. Damasio and Damasio 18] .
Toy models and realistic modeling
Modern physics has had it as a very powerful methodology that very structured phenomena in a complicated system are investigated in toy models. In other words, phenomena like super-conductivity, magnetism, liquid crystals etc., are not searched for by starting from the well established dynamical laws of systems of nuclei and electrons. Instead, some essential features of the elements, deemed relevant to the structured, emergent phenomenon under investigation, are represented in a simple tractable model. If the dynamics of the toy model actually produces the expected structure, the robustness of the phenomenon to the reintroduction of the omitted complexity of the underlying elements is investigated. This iteration serves both to justify the toy as well as to study further details of the emerging structures.
The discussion in sections 1 and 5 above has left us with a double task:
The demonstration of a theoretical framework in which a plurality of stimulus selective persistent activities can be embedded in a single assembly of neuronlike elements; The demonstration that in such a framework correlations (context sensitivity) emerge between reverberations (internal representations) corresponding to uncorrelated learned stimuli.
The rst task has been solved by the Hop eld model 19, 20] which has served as the basic toy model in describing the emergence of a diversity of structured attractors, robust to many types of random damage and noise. This was done by employing an explicit form for a synaptic matrix, that has a learning avor, in the sense that the set of synaptic e cacies is constructed, in an additive fashion, from the correlations of activities of neural pairs in a erent patterns that are to be the attractors of the network. This is in the grain of the Hebbian paradigm. Namely, external stimuli to be learned impose activity distributions on an assembly, which in the learning process develops a set of synaptic e cacies that can maintain, autonomously such activity distributions as reverberations. It is after all the synaptic matrix, and only the synaptic matrix that can maintain the delay activity in the absence of the stimulus. The possibility of generating a synaptic matrix which endows a network with a large variety of di erent robust attractors in a single module, was the main achievement of this model. Moreover, the formulation of the model allowed for the detailed computation of many properties of the dynamical response of the assembly to external a erent stimuli.
Furthermore, this toy model has also served to generate metaphors for several psychiatric and neurological pathologies. Ho mann 21] has used it to describe a distinction between mania and schizophrenia. Virasoro 23] has used the properties of this model under a random destruction of synapses (a lesion) to capture phenomena such as prosopagnosia.
Yet this model has left unanswered a whole set of questions of detail. A representative list includes:
The model predicts high spike rates in attractors, while recordings produce rates much below saturation 22]. In fact, the attractors in the model are activity distributions in which about half the neurons in the assembly are quiescent while the other half emits spikes at saturation rates. This allowed modeling in terms of binary discrete variables for the neurons; The recorded coding levels 4 in a given reverberation, are much lower than the 50% implied by the toy model; The model produced auto-associative networks, i.e. with attractors as close as possible to the memorized stimuli, while experiment did not 2, 3]; It predicted a bi-modal distribution of rates in an attractor, unlike the empirical observation. Early criticisms of the Hop eld model have concentrated on the type of synaptic matrices used. Symmetric, fully connected matrices, with random distribution of excitatory and inhibitory synapses on the axons of each neuron, and in nite analog depth 5 for each synapse, have made the analysis by theoretical physicists easier. Those are unrealistic impositions, since it is unlikely that the cortex will generate symmetric synaptic structures; cortex is connected at most at a level of 10% 16]; excitation and inhibition nd their places on di erent neurons { Dale's rule. Yet these criticisms have been shown to be relatively innocuous. The synaptic dilution and the limited analog depth of the synapses have been treated by Sompolinsky 26] and shown to a ect the performance of the network only mildly. If fact, in some cases the performance per remaining material resource (such as storage capacity per surviving synapse) was found even to improve in the less ideal system. Also the question of the low coding levels has been found to be relatively simple. Though its resolution has brought to light the fact that if one looked for a network with uniform thresholds for the neurons, the behavior of the network is strongly dependent on the choice of the representation for the neural states. If one insists on representing neurons by two state variables, there is a clear advantage, in representing these states by (0,1) over ({1,1) (see e.g. refs. 24, 25]).
A more elaborate modi cation of the dynamics of the original toy model was required in order to account for the relatively low spike rates in the attractors observed in experiment. It required a more detailed treatment of the single neuron dynamics, arriving at a description of neurons in terms of coupled systems of a erent currents and e erent spike rates. This description has produced networks with attractors operating far below the saturation of the neurons composing the network (see e.g. refs. 27, 28]). The modi ed networks, with low (arbitrary) coding levels and low spike rates preserved the main features of the original toy model: robust diversity of attractors, classifying stimuli auto-associatively. Two outstanding issues remained: auto-associativity and bi-modality.
The di cult problem of modifying a network to form attractors with correlations of the Miyashita type from uncorrelated stimuli learned in a xed order, found a 4 The proportion of neurons in the assembly with elevated spike rates 5 The ability to maintain with high precision a large number of di erent, closely spaced values.
solution with a avor of the Miyashita training scenario, at the level of the toy model. Indicating once again the usefulness of such models as drawing boards for new ideas. Auto-associative ANN's are based on the idea that the synaptic matrix codes for the correlations of activities of pairs of neurons as induced by a given a erent stimulus. The neural pair correlations in di erent stimuli are coded independently of each other. It was shown 29] that when synaptic modi cations, induced by training on a sequence of stimuli presented in a xed order, record also the correlations of the activities of pairs of neurons induced by one stimulus with that of its immediate predecessor in the sequence, then the resulting attractors display correlations of the Miyashita type. The resulting attractors, each classi ed by the uncorrelated stimulus that had been learned and that excites it, are correlated for as far as ve apart in the training sequence. This theoretic result has manifested itself in a dramatic way, in that each persistent delay activity (attractor) has a nite similarity index with exactly ve of the nearest stimuli in the sequence 30]. It is just the approximate range of signi cant correlations observed in the experiment. But this surprising ve was deduced in the rather arti cial context of the toy model.
Note that two types of correlations enter this discussion, and they should not be confused: One is the correlations of activities of pairs of neurons, during the presentation of stimuli for learning. They drive the Hebbian learning. Then, when learning had generated the synaptic matrix, the network's dynamics is controlled by that matrix. In particular, this synaptic matrix determines the structure of the attractors (delay activity distributions). The correlations between these attractors are the second type. They are the ones measured by Miyashita.
The promise of the result was in that 1. Synaptic information about single neighbor contiguity in the training sequence, i.e. the inclusion in the synaptic e cacies (learning) of activity correlations of pairs of neurons, one active as driven by a given stimulus and the other by the preceding one, was su cient to induce correlations of the corresponding internal representations to a distance compatible with experiment; 2. The attractor picture underlying the model makes the information about a preceding stimulus in a training sequence naturally available in the persistent attractor, at the time of presentation of the current stimulus. Recall that the network is supposed to code for activity correlations in successive rst stimuli.
Any two such stimuli are presented with a separation of many seconds. But, the existence of attractors allows the information of one, rst, stimulus to be around for as long as is needed for the subsequent stimulus to be presented.; 3. The form of the correlations (magnitude of coe cients and its rate of decay as function of separation in the training sequence) was found to be independent (in a certain range) of the value of the contiguity amplitude parameter, which is the relative strength of the contribution to the synaptic e cacy due to neighboring images in the training sequence to the contribution due to each image separately.
In fact, the phenomenon persists, when the formal neurons are replaced by quasirealistic, integrate-and-re, neurons 10]. An ANN operating with a synaptic matrix containing information on temporal contiguity in the training process, preserves the main features of the attractor correlations in the systems of discrete neurons. The correlation coe cients (Kendal rank coe cients, as used in the experiments) of the network of realistic neurons , which also includes reactive, separated inhibition, agree quantitatively quite well with the measured values, (Fig. 4) . Moreover, the more realistic model presents some additional features which brings the model even closer to the biological experience:
The attractors expressing the Miyashita correlations do not exhibit a simple bimodal distribution of spike activity among the neurons in the assembly 10]. All previous ANN models produced sharp bi-modality, either because the neurons were discrete, i.e. quiet or at saturation frequencies, or because the models implemented auto-associativity. Experiments manifest attractors, but not simple bi-modality. The model predicts a large, stimulus selective, peak at very low spike frequencies, and a wide distribution of rates among the active neurons. Consequently, the combination of realistic neurons and attractor correlations (i.e. the departure from auto-associativity) gives a potential response to the problem of the nature of the rate distribution.
To conclude this discussion we show one more measurement carried out both on the model and on the performing monkey. In Fig. 5 we show the distribution of activities produced in a given neuron in the reverberations provoked by the presentation of the complete set of learned stimuli. One sees the rate of spike emission by this neuron, in the delay period, for each of the stimuli plotted in the order in which they had been learned. This is not the right context in which to develop a more detailed discussion of the confrontation of theory with experiment. It can be found in ref . 10] . The discussion has been opened here only to indicate that the insights gained by the interpretation of the Miyashita experiments in the language of attractor dynamics is accompanied by a candidate model which captures the experimental results to a very impressive degree of detail. Such a model can consequently serve as a drawing board for the development of future paradigms in cognitive psychology.
Predictive theories
The attractor description as a language and as a set of models is a strongly predictive framework. It produces, as in Section 6, several detailed experimental predictions even prior to the elaboration of detailed models. The models enlarge the predictive set of commitments of the approach. The detailed studies 10] lead to the following predictions:
The appearance of the uncorrelated reverberations described in Section 6, either due to short training periods, or to training with random sequences of stimuli, should be accompanied by narrower distributions of spike rates. The relation between the coding rate of the stimuli, the fraction of the module's neurons driven into high rates when the stimulus is present, to the coding rate in the corresponding attractor 10]; Statistics of the distribution of spike rates expressed on a given neuron by the entire set of stimuli memorized in the assembly (ibid); If pair associations are formed by the training process, as in ref. 3] , then when the pair attractors become correlated, by partially ordering the pairs (see e.g. discussion at end of Section 5), the correlations of the pair attractors will be very high and will extend far down the sequence.
The list can be continued.
9 Some provisos and defensive outlook
The above picture sounds too good. It may still have to undergo modi cations. The main exposed anks we perceive at this stage are: It may be the case that the Miyashita correlated reverberations are not autonomous, in the sense that they are not really coded in the observed area, but re ect attractor activity in one or several other areas. Such modules could then drive a erently the module observed. This is a question which should be given serious attention; The speci c predictions follow from models with a prescribed synaptic matrix. This may be too restrictive. The models represent in a plausible way the learning process hypothesized (see e.g. ref. 29] for discussion). What gives it some credence is the relative robustness of the results to variations in the structure of the synaptic matrix, provided the logic of learning a sequence of stimuli with xed order is maintained. In particular, there is the robustness under variation of the contiguity amplitude parameter. (See e.g. items 1 and 3, in Section 7;
The neural elements in the model networks may still be somewhat too idealized. This may be at the origin of some systematic di erences in the details of the attractor correlation coe cients and rate distributions.
Even if some modi cations are required, the reverberation picture is too fertile to be rapidly discarded. We have received it from Hebb aged some fty years. It has only recently been given a direct empirical (neuro-physiological) dimension 1, 2, 3] and has been endowed with a precise mathematical model 19, 29] . One is tempted to start drawing a host of speculative conclusions from the new framework exposed by Miyashita's monkeys. The context provides fertile ground for adventures in cognitive psychology and even for some aspects of linguistics ranging from binding, which may be related to syntax, to priming, which may be extrapolated to semantics. It may even suggest a substrate for psychology itself.
Yet the lessons learned from these experiments include the one which advises restraint. It is just these experiments which indicate that our imagination concerning brain computation is still too much constrained by formal mathematics, by computer languages and by arti cial intelligence. In this connection it is well worth recalling the wisdom of John Von Neumann, writing 40 years ago:
...Thus the outward forms of our mathematics are not absolutely relevant from the point of view of evaluating what the mathematical or logical language truly used by the central nervous system is... the above remarks about reliability and logical and mathematical depth prove that whatever the system is, it cannot fail to di er considerably from what we consciously and explicitly consider as mathematics. 
